An alternate position on the India-Pakistan war in May 2025
In the first part of this article, we developed a critique of the positions taken by various leftwing organizations in response to the latest India-Pakistan conflict, primarily based on the class and nationality basis of their organizations. In this part, we present an alternative framework to analyze this conflict.
The conflict and the subsequent 24 hours coverage in the media, it was evident that the brutal oppression of Kashmiris going on for decades had been deliberately vanished from the narrative. The only question raised by Indian media was how any oppressed group could use similar violence that the state has been using against them for decades. It was erased from discourse that the Pehalgam attack, horrific in nature, is an outcome of the Indian state’s suppression of Kashmiri nationalism.
It is impossible to understand the recent India Pakistan conflict in isolation from the fact that the Pehalgam incident took place at a time when the Modi government had already declared that they resolved the Kashmir issue with a brute force which Congress could only have dreamed of resolving. Now, whether Pakistan was involved or not, the Indian government had no option but to pin it on the external actor otherwise the claim of ending the conflict in Kashmir could not have been maintained.
But the question is why Pakistan exists as the key external factor on which India could pin many of its internal issues or India as an external factor on which Pakistan can pin all its issues. Labeling various activists and political groups as RAW or ISI agents has been a norm in both the countries, especially if these activists or groups belong to oppressed nationalities.
To say that the India Pakistan conflict exists because of factors external to both, like geopolitical configuration of the world, is misleading. It is true that the geopolitical situation, especially imperialism influences the politics and nature of the semi-colonies but it can only work on the contradictions that already exist in one way or another. We need to remember that the conflict between India and Pakistan predates the current geopolitical configuration. India was closer to the Soviet Union till the 1980s, although keeping its character of non-alignment to some extent. So, even if one sees the current conflict in the wake of new geopolitical rivalry between US and China, the conflict was the same under old geopolitical configurations and therefore begs for material roots of the conflict to develop any understanding.
So, our approach in this article is to explore the dialectics of the nationality questions in each country and the conflict between these two states. The material and historical roots of both the questions take us back to the partition of the subcontinent, which not only provides the contradictions on which the two countries were created but also the understanding of national question at that time and its relation with the partition.
Commonly, there are two perspectives around partition. According to the first perspective: we would have been living in a unified India had the British colonial power not used the policy of divide and rule. The second perspective: material roots of partition lies in the cultural differences eminent between Ganga-Yamuna and Indus valley civilizations.
However, there is also a third perspective that provides us the opportunity to see the dialectical relation between the nationality question and the material roots of partition. The most convincing case is made by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in their document: The Nationality Question in India. It depicts the necessary link between the national question and the partition of the subcontinent into two warring states.
We will use this framework to analyze the material roots of partition and the national question, allowing us to analyze the recent India-Pakistan conflict and address the question of the possibilities that exist today for an anti-imperialist movement under such contradictions.
Material Roots of Partition and the National Question
After establishing the theoretical foundation, The Nationality Question in India by CPI (Maoist) begins by asserting that never in the history of the subcontinent had such a vast united territory remained as stable as modern-day India before British colonial rule.
Although rulers like Ashoka and the Gupta dynasty were able to unite vast lands into their empires, in both cases this unity was temporary. As soon as their power declined or their rule ended, these lands disintegrated into smaller independent states. The Mughal rulers made the last such effort, and by the middle of the eighteenth century these lands again fragmented into different feudatories. This instability was inevitable due to the feudal nature of the region, which provided no basis for a stable country.
However, the document stresses that by the time the British arrived in the subcontinent, small-scale manufacturing and trade had already begun, and urban populations were growing. This led to the initial development of different languages and nationalities. British colonialism, however, arrested this process, as it required the entire region to function as a single market. Under the British Raj, most merchant capitalists were either transformed into comprador and auxiliary classes of the colonial masters, or wiped out. Consequently, this class neither supported nationality movements in their respective areas nor the struggle for independence from British rule.
Beyond the betrayal of this class, British colonialism became the primary contradiction for the people of the subcontinent, compelling them to set aside national and other non-antagonistic contradictions to unite against colonial rule. Simultaneously, imperialist power and its local allies worked to suppress the development of nationalities. The CPI (Maoist) document notes that even the division of India into large administrative units was part of a colonial strategy to hinder the development of distinct nationalities. This colonial approach is still reflected in Pakistan’s state narrative, reminding us that the same classes and institutions developed to facilitate colonial rule continue to govern and now serve contemporary imperialist powers.
CPI (Maoist) correctly centers its discussion on the partition of Bengal to explain the roots of partition, revealing contrasting views with the MKP’s thesis. While MKP emphasizes the contradiction between Muslim lower-caste oppressed classes and Hindu landowning and moneylending classes as the “material roots” of Bengal’s partition, linking it to conditions created by the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. CPI (Maoist) connects the partition to the British colonial plan to curb the development of nationality consciousness and anti-colonial sentiment, culminating in the division of Bengal in 1905.
There is no doubt that a contradiction existed between Hindu zamindars, empowered through the Permanent Settlement, and Muslim lower-caste peasants. However, two additional facts must be considered. First, the upper-caste elite did not constitute the majority among Bengali Hindus. Second, contradictions also existed between Muslim Ashrafs (elites) and jotedars (rich peasants but not as powerful as feudals) and the Hindu Zimmidars (fuedals) bhadralok (urban elite). While MKP correctly identified the contradiction between Muslim oppressed classes and the Hindu bhadralok, it overlooked the fact that Hindu oppressed classes faced the same contradiction with the zamindars. As a result, the Muslim peasantry of Bengal, despite developing its own organizations, aligned with Muslim Ashrafs against the Hindu bhadralok, failing to develop class unity with Hindu counterparts and ultimately supporting partition.
A further question arises: if the British had found loyal Hindu zamindars effective in managing tax collection, why did they introduce the partition of Bengal in 1905? Officially, Lord Curzon justified the move on administrative grounds, claiming Bengal was too large to govern efficiently.
History, however, shows that colonial motives often differed from stated intentions.
Calcutta was among the earliest cities of the subcontinent, as reflected in Mirza Ghalib’s letters describing it as a city of transactions, where even relationships were transactional. Due to this early urbanization, nationality consciousness and anti-colonial sentiment developed earlier here than elsewhere. The British, aware of the contradictions which they created between the Hindus and Muslims by the Permanent Settlement, exploited the same contradictions to gain support from both Muslim elites and oppressed classes for the partition as this act had developed a domination of Hindu ruling classes in Bengal. Lord Curzon used these contradictions to divide Bengal along communal lines.
This decision marked a turning point in the subcontinent’s history. It provoked a reaction broader and more popular than the 1857 uprising, eventually forcing the reversal of the decision in 1911. While sharpening the primary contradiction against colonial rule, it also gave birth to Hindu revivalism. Organizations such as Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha emerged, and slogans like Vande Mataram and Akhand Bharat were introduced for the first time. This communal reaction further intensified insecurity among Muslim elites, leading to the formation of the Muslim League in 1906 as another organized collaborator of colonial power.
According to CPI (Maoist), alongside intensifying anti-colonial struggle and communal tensions, this process also triggered nationality movements across the subcontinent. These movements forced the Indian National Congress to declare that independent India would consist of multiple states based on nationality and language. Under similar pressure, the Muslim League used the term “independent states” rather than a single state in the 1940 Lahore Resolution, while the INC declared in 1941 that no area would be included in a new country without the consent of its people.
The history and consequences of partition demonstrate that its material roots were not directly tied to oppressed classes, although their contradictions were exploited by the British Raj and its Hindu and Muslim auxiliary classes to suppress emerging nationality movements. None of the ruling alliances wanted the British to leave the subcontinent in the hands of multiple developing nationalities. Instead, a division into two dominions, one controlled by a loyal Muslim elite and the other by a loyal Hindu elite served their interests. Without recognizing the centrality of the national question alongside imperialism and colonialism, any analysis of the India–Pakistan conflict is bound to be misleading.
National Question and the India–Pakistan Conflict
If we extend this premise, religion and mutual hostility remain the primary basis of existence for both states. They offer no other justification for colonizing numerous nationalities, and this internal colonialism also explains their expansionist behavior. This same logic motivated Pakistan’s annexation of Balochistan in 1948 and its persistent efforts to turn Afghanistan into a satellite state serving its geopolitical ambitions. Despite differences in scale, both states are expansionist by virtue of their nature and the role of their ruling classes in facilitating imperialist exploitation of both their peoples and the region.
Therefore, instead of viewing India’s current aggression toward Pakistan solely through the lens of expansionism which has existed since its inception, analysis must focus on Kashmir and the Modi government’s attempts to violently resolve the national question there. Here, we agree with Dr. Azeem and Umar that much of the left remains trapped in Khrushchev’s line of democratic revolution and the US-imperialist narrative of “terrorism.”
Whether attacks on Chinese experts by Baloch militants or incidents like Pehalgam, such acts are quickly condemned as “terrorism” without thorough analysis. This is not to deny the tragedy or wrongfulness of killing civilians, but it pales in comparison to the continuous violence and oppression faced by the peoples of Kashmir and Balochistan. Power determines what is labeled terrorism, and many on the left adopt this logic. What Al-Qaeda did in New York is universally called terrorism, while what the US did in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and elsewhere though condemned by parts of the left is rarely framed in the same terms.
It ultimately does not matter whether the Pehalgam attack was carried out by a secular leftist organization, a Pakistani-sponsored religious group, or was orchestrated by the Modi government itself, as no transparent investigation has been conducted. The real question, posed by progressive forces in India, is how such incidents occur despite draconian laws, demographic engineering, mass militarization, restrictions on private life, and relentless brutality in Kashmir. As Fanon explains, colonies return the violence inflicted upon them. Responsibility therefore lies with the Indian state, which attempted to impose peace through bloodshed, only to expose its own reality through incidents like Pehalgam.
Having constructed a fascist narrative under Modi that claims the Kashmir question has been settled through repression, the Indian state resorted to blaming Pakistan and attacking alleged “dens of terrorism,” mimicking the behavior of powers like the US and Israel. Yet Pakistan is no different: it shares the same foundations of existence—hatred, militarism, dependence on imperialist capital, and alignment with imperialist wars and strategies. The depth of this dependence is evident in how a single tweet by Trump ended a skirmish between two major armies.
India used the moment to intensify repression against Dalit and Adivasi resistance in Bastar and to promote hatred against Muslims and oppressed nationalities. Pakistan, meanwhile, used it to demonize the Baloch militant struggle and portray Afghanistan as an Indian proxy, increasing military spending and escalating operations in Balochistan and KP. Even in Kashmir, Pakistan exploited national sentiment against India while never genuinely supporting the Kashmiri struggle. Instead, it promoted groups under its control to keep the movement religion-centric rather than national, fearing that a nationalist movement would also erupt in Azad Kashmir, where Kashmiris seek complete independence.
Whether in Kashmir, Balochistan, or previously in Bangladesh, both states consistently deflect blame outward rather than addressing internal contradictions. This tendency is mirrored in recent left positions, which focus externally rather than internally. Dr. Ammar frames Indian aggression through global rivalry between US imperialism and China, while Dr. Azeem and Umar emphasize Indian expansionism and alliances with Israel, arguing against “unprincipled peace.”
Recent actions by the Pakistani state praising Trump’s plan for Palestine and escalating aggression against the Taliban regime demonstrate that no real shift in alignment is occurring, contrary to claims by some commentators. While Maoist references are frequently invoked, a fundamental Maoist lesson is ignored: analysis that neglects internal contradictions is inevitably flawed and subjective.
Thus, understanding both the national and class questions is essential not only to grasp the nature of these states but also to envision any viable solution.
National Question and the Anti-Imperialist Movement
The article has established that the material roots of partition and the nature of both Indian and Pakistani states cannot be explained through abstract civilizational differences or by reducing all provincial experiences to a single communal class contradiction.
While such contradictions existed in some areas, contradictions between ruling classes of both communal groups also existed or were deliberately manufactured through colonial policies such as the Permanent Settlement and the partition of Bengal. These policies aimed to halt the development of nationalities and weaken anti-colonial movements.
These interventions, along with the early formation of political institutions among auxiliary Hindu and Muslim elites, created conditions in which oppressed classes particularly in Bengal and Punjab aligned with their respective ruling classes rather than developing united struggles against colonialism, feudalism, and imperialism. This enabled the British to exit the subcontinent not as fragmented nations but as two dominions controlled by Hindu and Muslim comprador-feudal classes dependent on imperialist capital.
As a result, the same contradictions that existed under colonialism became the central contradictions of Pakistan and India: the national question and the imperialist question.
In Pakistan, attempts by Punjabi and Mohajir ruling classes to maintain imperialist patterns of uneven development brought the national question to the surface rapidly. Bengal, with its advanced industry, commerce, education, political institutions, language development, and urbanization, possessed a strong national consciousness that was difficult to suppress. Given that Bengalis comprised more than half of Pakistan’s population, resistance to political, economic, and cultural subjugation was inevitable.
To maintain control, the ruling classes abolished provincial autonomy and imposed the One Unit scheme, intensifying center–periphery contradictions. Resistance to this policy ultimately forced its repeal. Without it, domination of Bengal was impossible. Subsequent elections left the state with the choice of transferring power or using force; the latter path led to separation. Explaining this outcome through civilizational differences or foreign interference avoids confronting internal contradictions.
Another common distortion is the claim that the Awami League won in East Pakistan while the PPP won in West Pakistan. In reality, the PPP won decisively only in Punjab and rural Sindh. In KP and Balochistan, nationality-based NAP governments were formed with JUI. After the secession of Bangladesh, the Bhutto government dissolved these provincial governments, banned NAP, and launched military operations in Balochistan, intensifying armed resistance.
Since then, the national question in Balochistan has intensified, alongside increased repression and resource exploitation. Instability persists in other regions as well, evident in movements such as PTM, anti-canal struggles in Sindh, and action committees in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. While many currently demand autonomy rather than liberation, these movements show that without addressing the national question, neither the state’s nature nor a meaningful struggle can be understood.
From its inception, Pakistan aligned with US imperialism, allowing its economy, labor, foreign policy, and military strategy to be shaped by imperialist interests. While China’s rise has complicated this alignment, Pakistan continues to balance competing imperialist powers within the global system.
The widespread error is analyzing the national and imperialist questions separately, leading to fragmented and even antagonistic struggles. This reflects a failure to understand the relationship between imperialism and internal colonialism in semi-feudal, semi-colonial societies like Pakistan.
In such contexts, ruling classes function as auxiliaries of imperialism, facilitating exploitation both internally and regionally. Projects like Reko Diq, Gwadar, Thar coal, corporate farming, and mineral deals primarily benefit imperialist capital. As Khair Bux Marri noted, Balochistan functions as a colony of a colony.
The left’s neglect or rejection of the national question thus weakens anti-imperialist struggle. A dialectical understanding linking both struggles is necessary. National liberation without class character risks replacing one form of dependency with another, while anti-imperialist struggle without uniting with the oppressed nationalities is impossible.
It is also critical to establish that we cannot look at every national question with the same lens. The nature of the national question differs within each nationality according to their development, class antagonisms and exploitation. Some of the nations have reached the stage of liberation, while some are only struggling for autonomy and rights within the state.
Only after genuine liberation (not necessarily separation in all cases) can nationalities decide their future relations whether alliance, confederation, or federation. CPI (Maoist)’s slogan “Let’s divide to unite” captures this logic. Unity–Division–Unity.
